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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
other business in a corporate capacity, without the imposition of these
taxes on individuals. 21
JoN R. JENKINS, JR.
Vendor and Purchaser-Construction of Instruments-Meaning
of Words "More or Less".
After pointing out its boundaries and corners to the plaintiff,
defendant contracted to exchange his farm, said to contain about 246
acres and valued at $18,000, for the plaintiff's farm plus $8,000. The
contract described defendant's farm as containing "247 acres more or
less." Several years later an anticipated sale of this farm was defeated
by the discovery of a forty acre shortage. In an action to recover for
this shortage, held judgment for defendant on the ground that this was
a sale by tract and the risk of deficiency was on the purchaser.'
The words "more or less" have been accorded varying significance
by the courts. The older rule, which purported to treat the words as if
they had a fixed and definite meaning in all deeds and land contracts,
announced that these words of themselves negatived a sale by acre, all
risk of variation being thereby placed upon the vendor in case of a
surplus, or upon the purchaser in case of a deficiency.2
Realizing that the problem in such cases is one of construction, and
that the intention of the parties should be objectively ascertained in
order to give actual meaning to these words, most courts take into con-
sideration the surrounding facts and circumstances of each case. Even
so, their treatment tends to become categorical. First, if the sale is
intended to be by acre, the words "more or less" will permit only slight
errors of survey or estimation, 3 and will not excuse substantial dis-
'A tendency to impose this additional tax upon corporations may be further
marked by a New York tax statute which provided that every transportation cor-
poration, in addition to a franchise tax, "shall pay for the privilege of exercising
its corporate franchises or carrying on its business in such corporate or organized
capacity in this state, . . ." an additional franchise tax. N. Y. CONS. LAWs
(Cahill, 1930) c. 61, §184. This tax has been upheld by memorandum decision,
People ex rel New York & Albany Litherage Co. v. Lynch, 229 App. Div. 823,
242 N. Y. S. 903 (1930), aff'd per curiam 259 N. Y. 638. 182 N. E. 214 (1932),
aff'd per curiam 288 U. S. 590, 53 Sup. Ct. 400, 77 L. ed. 969 (1933) commented
upon (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 738.
'Huffman v. Landes, 177 S. E. 200 (Va., 1934).
2 Musselman v. Moxley, 152 Md. 13, 136 Atl. 48 (1927) ; Jollife v. Hite, 1 Call.
301 (Va., 1789) ; Keyton v. Brawford, 5 Leigh. 48 (Va., 1834) ; cf. Clark v. Car-
penter, 19 N. J. Eq. 328 (1868). A series of more recent Georgia cases consider the
fact situation but hold the words "more or less" to be controlling: Goette v. Sutton,
128 Ga. 179, 57 S. E. 308 (1907) ; White v. Adams, 7 Ga. App. 764, 68 S. E. 271
(1910) ; Georgia etc. Co. v. Buck, 134 Ga. 674, 68 S. E. 514 (1910) ; Milner v.
Tyler, 9 Ga. App. 659, 71 S. E. 1123 (1911).
'Hodges v. Denny, 86 Ala. 226, 5 So. 492 (1888) ; Rathke v. Tyler, 136 Iowa
284, 111 N. W. 435 (1907); Wilson v. Randall, 67 N. Y. 338 (1876); Paine v.
Upton, 87 N. Y. 327 (1882).
NOTES AKD COMMENTS
crepancies. 4 Second, where the sale is said to be in gross the courts
have laid down four different rules: (1) many cases hold the contract
to be one of hazard, placing the risk of variation on the parties to the
contract ;5 (2) another large group holds that the words merely guard
against slight errors of quantity,6 and a substantial deviation will be
grounds for relief ;7 (3) a few have pronounced a definite percentage of
variation as a dividing line between the granting and refusing of
relief ;8 and (4) two courts have held the recital of area to be a war-
ranty of quantity despite the "more or less" qualification. 9
'Triplett v. Allen, 26 Gratt. 721 (Va., 1875); Pratt v. Bowman, 37 W. Va.
721, 17 S. E. 210 (1893); cf. Sullivan v. Ferguson, 40 Mo. App. 79 (1867);
Frenche v. Chancellor, 51 N. J. Eq. 624, 27 At. 140 (1893).
Libby v. Dickey, 85 Me. 362, 27 Atl. 253 (1893) (relief denied when deficiency
was 400 out of 800 acres) ; Erskine v. Wilson, 41 S. C. 198, 19 S. E. 489 (1893)(no recovery for 125 acres deficiency in 253) ; Waters v. Hutton, 85 Tenn. 109,
1 S. W. 787 (1886) (no relief when vendor's title to 64 acres out of 307 failed) ;
Trinkle v. Jackson, 86 Va. 238, 9 S. E. 986 (1889) (no relief for 440 acre deficiency
in 2376) ; Southern v. Sine, 95 W. Va. 634, 123 S. E. 436 (1924) (no recovery .for
29 acre deficiency in 170). See also Stebbins v. Eddy, Fed. Cas. No. 13,342 (C.
C. R. I. 1827) ; Frederick v. Youngblood, 19 Ala. 680 (1851) ; Harrell v. Hill,
19 Ark. 102 (1857) ; Dale v. Smith, 1 Del. Ch. 1 (1814) ; Beall v. Berkhalter, 26
Ga. 564 (1858) ; Armstrong v. Brownfield, 32 Kan. 116 (1884) ; Foster v. Byrd,
119 Mo. App. 168, 96 S. W. 224 (1906) ; Sprague v. Eypper and Beckman Inc.,
108 N. J. Eq. 239, 154 Atl. 615 (1931).
'Scott v. Dunkel Box etc. Co., 106 Ark. 83, 152 S. W. 1025 (1912) ; Russo v.
Corideo, 102 Conn. 663, 129 At]. 849 (1925); Kendall v. Wells, 126 Ga. 343,
55 S. E. 41 (1906) ; King v. Brown, 54 Ind. 368 (1876) ; Kitzman v. Carl, 133
Iowa 340, 110 N. W. 587 (1907) ; Couse v. Boyles, 4 N. J. Eq. 212 (1842) ; Oakes
v. DeLancey, 133 N. Y. 227, 30 N. E. 974 (1892); Watson v. Cline, 42 S. W.
1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897) ; Quesnel v. Woodlief, 2 Va. 173 (1808) ; cf. Wilson
v. Rafter, 188 Mo. App. 356, 174 S. W. 137 (1915); White v. Miller, 22 Vt.
380 (1850); McComb v. Gilkeson, 110 Va. 406, 66 S. E. 77 (1909).
'Hostleton v. Dickinson, 51 Iowa 244, 1 N. W. 550 (1879); Belknap v. Sealy,
14 N. Y. 143 (1856) ; Bigham v. Madison, 103 Tenn. 358, 52 S. W. 1074 (1899)
(rescission granted for 12.5 acre deficiency in 25) ; Pratt v. Bowman, 37 W. Va.
721, 17 S. E. 210 (1893) (relief granted vendor where there was an 80 per cent
excess). See also Hays v. Hays, 126 Ind. 92, 93, 25 N. E. 600, 601 (1890);
Wheeler v. Boyd, 69 Tex. 293, 297, 6 S. W. 614, 617 (1887).
' See Bigham v. Madison, 103 Tenn. 358, 363, 52 S. W. 1074, 1075 (1899)
(maximum discrepancy allowable is 10 to 15 per cent, 20 per cent is too great,
and 33 1-3 per cent is such an amount as "universally has obtained relief" even
though sale is in gross.) Cf. Pratt v. Bowman, 37 W. Va. 721, 17 S. E. 210
(1893). In Kentucky an inflexible rule was laid down in Harrison v. Talbot,
32 Ky. 258 (1834) (limits discrepancies in all sales in gross to ten per cent).
Followed: Anthony v. Hudson, 131 Ky. 185, 114 S. W. 782 (1908); Travis v.
Taylor, 118 S. W. 988 (Ky. 1909); Boggs v. Bush, 137 Ky. 95, 122 S. W. 220
(1909) ; Paisley v. Hatter, 143 Ky. 633, 137 S. W. 250 (1911) ; Salyer v. Blessing,
151 Ky. 459, 152 S. W. 275 (1913); Cook v. McKee, 235 Ky. 1, 29 S. W. (2d)
571 (1930). If sale is by boundary without reference to the number of acres, no
recovery for any shortage may be had. Wilson v. Morris, 192 Ky. 469, 233 S. W.
1049 (1921) ; cf. Sanders v. Lindsey, 204 Ky. 57, 263 S. W. 718 (1924) (where
deed specifically provided "that this land is sold by the boundary and not by the
acre," the purchaser of "300 acres, be the same more or less" could not recover
for 45 acre deficiency) ; Sheets v. McDonald, 213 Ky. 595, 281 S. W. 536 (1926)
(no recovery was allowed for 19.5 acre deficiency in 138, because it clearly appeared
that the parties intended to risk the contingency of quantity). Thus, by careful
drafting of deeds and contracts the effects of a rigid rule may be avoided.
'Gardner v. Kiburz, 184 Iowa 1268, 168 N. W. 814 (1918) ; Mahrt v. Mann,
203 Iowa 880, 210 N. W. 566 (1926) (because of Statute of Limitations plain-
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In general the North Carolina cases consider the surrounding facts,
but they, too, place the cases in categories and decide them on the basis
of strict rules. Thus, if the parties to the contract intended a sale by
acre, a deficiency or surplus is a basis for relief,' 0 following the general
rule stated in the preceding paragraph. However, if the sale is held
to be in gross, then the first of the four rules mentioned above is applied,
and in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation the risk of divergence
is on the parties." In these sale by tract cases the doctrine, of caveat
emptor is applied, the court denying relief even where the deficiency is
very great.' 2 However, a vendor's representation of quantity, although
orally made, is held to be binding upon him.' 8
In construing these contracts the purpose of the courts should be to
effectuate the intention of the contracting parties, so far as possible, as
well as to preserve predictability of decisions for practical reasons. The
most reliable means of determining what is intended by the words "more
or less" is to construe them in the light of all the facts of the transaction:
price, type of land, size of tract, and situation of the parties are highly
relevant. Even where the sale is actually in gross the words should
not place risk of discrepancies upon the contracting parties unless the
facts show clearly that they anticipated assumption of the risk. This
test is applied in the instant case with a desirable outcome. Definition
and resultant legal effect must vary from case to case. It is submitted
that loss of consistency in decision (the most compelling reason for the
rigid North Carolina rule applied in the gross sales cases) is compensated
by the obviation of hardship in most cases.
WELCH JORDAN.
tiff's only remedy was for breach of the implied warranty) ; Miller v. Wissert,
38 Okla. 808, 134 Pac. 62 (1913). In these cases the courts call the transactions
sales in gross, but in deciding the cases on the facts treat them as sales by acre.
In effect the courts delete the words "more or less" from the agreement.
"
0Duffy v. Phipps, 180 N. C. 313, 104 S. E. 655 (1920).
a' McArthur and Walker v. Morris, 84 N. C. 405 (1881) (no relief for 90
acre shortage in 245) ; Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N. C. 758, 36 S. E. 153 (1900)
(no recovery for 238 acre shortage in 500) ; Bethell v. McKinney, 164 N. C. 71, 80
S. E. 162 (1913) ; Turner and Parker v. Vann, 171 N. C. 127, 87 S. E. 985 (1916)
(no relief for deficiency of 170 acres in 550).
A failure of title in the absence of the covenant of seizin brings the same
result as in Smathers v. Gilmer, supra, when recital of acreage is qualified by the
words "more or less." Lantz v. Howell, 181 N. C. 401, 107 S. E. 437 (1921);
cf. Guy v. Joint Stock Land Bank of Columbia, 205 N. C. 357; 171 S. E. 341
(1933).
" Walsh v. Hall, 66 N. C. 233 (1872); Etheridge v. Vernoy, 70 N. C. 713
(1874). See also cases cited note 11, supra.
" Stern v. Benbow, 151 N. C. 460, 66 S. E. 445 (1909) ; and note language in
Smathers v. Gilmer, 126 N. C. 758, 759, 36 S. E. 153, 154 (1900).
